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“Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this 
island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world 
who yearn to breathe freely?”1 
- Ronald W. Reagan 
I. INTRODUCTION
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump made illegal 
immigration a signature issue of his campaign.2 Among his claims 
was that “Mexico was sending violent criminals, including rapists, to 
the United States.”3 Trump also called for the deportation of “more 
than eleven million undocumented immigrants living in the United 
States” and threatened to “triple the number of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement [ICE] agents.”4 He promised to “restrict legal 
immigration”5 and put an end to birthright citizenship, which 
extends automatic citizenship to children born in the United States.6 
Trump pledged not only to build a wall across the entire southern 
United States border, but also to have Mexico pay for it.7  
After inauguration, President Trump wasted no time 
implementing many of his campaign promises with a barrage of 
harsh anti-immigrant policies—mostly by executive order.8 On one 
day alone, President Trump signed two such orders. The first, 
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” 
announced massive immigration enforcement priorities destined to 
1. Ronald Reagan, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the
Republican National Convention in Detroit (July 17, 1980). 





6. See Robert Farley, Trump Challenges Birthright Citizenship, FACTCHECK.ORG
(Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.factcheck.org/2015/11/trump-challenges-birthright-
citizenship/ [https://perma.cc/32D2-QLAE].  
7. Bob Woodward & Robert Costa, Trump Reveals How He Would Force Mexico to
Pay for Border Wall, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/po 
litics/trump-would-seek-to-block-money-transfers-to-force-mexico-to-fund-border-w 
all/2016/04/05/c0196314-fa7c-11e5-80e4-c381214de1a3_story.html?utm_term=.a  
7e 86b1b9210 [https://perma.cc/ASY9-J8CB]. 
8. See President Donald J. Trump Taking Action Against Illegal Immigration, WHITE 
HOUSE (June 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/preside 
nt-donald-j-trump-taking-action-illegal-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/4RMD-
UJD5] (outlining President Trump’s early actions regarding immigration). 
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devastate immigrant communities.9 The second, “Border Security 
and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” included costly 
plans to further militarize the United States-Mexico border, build 
the wall he promised during his campaign, and increase 
immigration enforcement priorities.10 Perhaps the most well-known 
(and unpopular) of his executive orders was the one he signed two 
days later, entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States,”11 which promised to “keep radical 
Islamic terrorists outside the United States.”12 This order left 
thousands of refugees facing life-threatening danger without 
protection by ceasing all refugee admissions for four months and the 
admission of Syrian refugees indefinitely.13 It also imposed a ninety-
day ban on entry for all people with immigrant and nonimmigrant 
visas from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syrian, and Yemen.14 After being blocked by various 
9. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). This executive
order prioritizes noncitizens for deportation so broadly that it puts all unauthorized 
individuals at risk, including families, long-time residents, those brought to the 
United States as children, and anyone who has committed chargeable criminal acts 
(which would include undocumented immigrants with no criminal history because 
entering without inspection is a chargeable criminal offense). See id. 
10. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). This executive
order: (1) demands the construction of a contiguous wall along the 2,000 mile 
southern border; (2) expands the use of expedited removal; (3) directs the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain individuals in removal 
proceedings (regardless of whether or not they are awaiting their court hearing); 
(4) allows to further deputize state and local law enforcement agencies to perform 
federal immigration enforcement functions; (5) directs the Attorney General to 
prioritize the prosecution of any offense connected with the southern border 
(including nonviolent offenses like unlawful entry); and (6) allows the DHS 
Secretary to heighten the credible fear standard that would make it even more 
difficult for asylum seekers to present their claims. See id.  
11. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (implementing
what is known as the “Muslim Ban”). 
12. David Millward, Donald Trump Announces Vetting Measures to ‘Keep Terrorists
Out of the United States’, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:07 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/27/donald-trump-announces-vetting-
measures-keep-terrorists-united/ [https://perma.cc/7Z3Y-EJKG].  
13. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); see Greg Chen
& Royce Murray, Summary and Analysis of Executive Order “Protecting the Nation from 
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”, AM. IMMIGR. L. ASS’N & AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.aila.org/infonet/analysis-executive-order-
visa-issuance-screening [https://perma.cc/MXM6-HGMZ]. 
14. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977–78 (Jan. 27, 2017).
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courts, President Trump signed a superseding order on March 6, 
2017.15 
In response to the President’s hard line stance on immigration, 
many American churches and other places of worship have declared 
themselves sanctuaries, or safe havens, for undocumented and other 
vulnerable immigrants.16 The number of sanctuary sites has more 
than doubled since Donald Trump took office, bringing the total to 
more than 800 according to the Church World Service.17 Part II of 
this article examines the origins of sanctuary as both a legal and 
moral obligation for churches and other places of worship. Part III 
looks at the history of the Sanctuary Movement in the United States 
in the 1980s, and the ways that sanctuary has shaped the current 
national immigration debate. Part IV explores how courts have 
interpreted liability under the anti-harboring provisions of section 
1324 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.18 And finally, Part V 
looks at what considerations congregations in today’s America will 
need to balance should they decide to offer sanctuary to America’s 
vulnerable immigrant population. 
II. ORIGINS OF SANCTUARY AS BOTH A LEGAL AND MORAL
OBLIGATION FOR CHURCHES AND OTHER PLACES OF WORSHIP
A. What is Sanctuary? 
There is no legal definition of the word “sanctuary.” In its 
simplest terms, it refers to both a holy place and a place of refuge 
and protection.19 James Corbett, one of the founders of the 
Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s,20 defines sanctuary as a 
15. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
16. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as Trump-Era
Immigrant Sanctuaries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
12/27/us/houses-of-worship-poised-to-serve-as-trump-era-immigrant-sanctuaries.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/ZC6G-QRJ5]. 
17. Gabriella Borter, Under Trump, More Churches Offer Sanctuary but Few Seek
Refuge, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-sanctuary/under-trump-more-churches-offer-sanctuary-but-few-seek-r 
efuge-idUSKBN1AH350 [https://perma.cc/ZE7E-MYJS] (citing the Church World 
Service, an international humanitarian organization).  
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012).
19. Sanctuary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictiona
ry/sanctuary [https://perma.cc/8U77-NBHC] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
20. See Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton & James Loucky, The Sanctuary
Movement and Central American Activism in Los Angeles, 36 LATIN AM. PERSP. 101, 105 
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“protective community with people whose basic human rights are 
being violated by government officials.”21 As a declared practice, he 
adds, “sanctuary holds the state accountable for its violations of 
human rights.”22 Eric Jorstad, who has written extensively about the 
Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, states that, as applied to 
immigrants, sanctuary is “an act of compassion, an expression of the 
fundamental Christian concern to love one’s neighbor . . . [a] way of 
providing for people in need, not only with social services, but also 
by giving them haven from the potentially disastrous consequences 
of deportation.”23 With respect to its purpose in the larger 
immigration debate, sanctuary does three things: (1) it “provides a 
safe haven for refugees who are under threat of deportation and 
subsequent threat of persecution when they are returned to their 
homelands;” (2) it “helps to resettle the refugees in the host 
community by providing emotional support, basic needs, and legal 
and social services;” and (3) it enables “endorsing congregation[s] 
to directly minister to the needs of the oppressed.”24 When we talk 
about sanctuary in today’s climate, we typically refer to places of 
worship that have somehow acted to provide support to 
undocumented immigrants who are most vulnerable to 
deportation.25  
B. Sanctuary in Early England 
Sanctuary is long established in Judeo-Christian norms, and 
today’s Sanctuary Movement can be traced back to medieval 
England, where churches provided legal protection to fugitives 
fleeing the law.26 The tradition of sanctuary is rooted in the power of 
an inviolable religious site to grant protection to persons who fear 
for their life or liberty.27 Although the Anglo-Saxon sanctuary had its 
(2009); see also infra Part III.A. 
21. JIM CORBETT, THE SANCTUARY CHURCH 5–6 (1986).
22. Id. at 6.
23. Eric Jorstad, Sanctuary for Refugees: A Statement on Public Policy, CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Mar. 14, 1984, at 275. 
24. Michele Altemus, The Sanctuary Movement, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 683, 684 n.7
(1988) (citing Michael Doan, Sanctuary Churches’ Way to Protest, 97 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. 45 (1984)). 
25. John Medeiros & Michele Garnett McKenzie, The Rise of the Sanctuary
Congregation, HENNEPIN LAW., May–June 2017, at 20. 
26. See id.
27. See Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. U.L.
5
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origins in ancient Judeo-Christian heritage, the privilege was 
eventually integrated into England’s judicial system.28 In the sixth 
century, “the newly converted and baptized Christian King 
Ethelbert, King of Kent, issued an Anglo-Saxon code of laws that 
included the recognition of the Church’s right to grant sanctuary 
and provided a penalty for a violation of the Church’s peace.”29 This 
reference to sanctity of churches is important because it shows how 
quickly churches came to be recognized by the state as “inviolable.”30 
Under this early asylum system, once inside the church, fugitives 
had forty days to surrender themselves to the authorities and stand 
trial for their crime (the punishment could include execution).31 
Otherwise, the fugitives could confess their guilt, take an oath to 
renounce the realm of England, and go into permanent exile.32 The 
primary benefit of sanctuary “was to delay a legal decision and enable 
fugitives to negotiate other options.”33 This concept of sanctuary as 
a means to explore legal alternatives would survive for several 
centuries.34 
Over the years, the Church clashed with the State over the final 
authority to grant sanctuary; the distinction was crucial.35 If the State 
granted sanctuary, it could regulate and even revoke it.36 But if the 
privilege of sanctuary flowed from the separate power of the Church, 
the State could not control it.37 It was ultimately during the reign of 
King Henry VIII (1509–1547) that the legal practice of sanctuary 
became highly regulated, eventually leading to its official 
abolishment.38 Interestingly, the concern at the time was not about 
REV. 583, 583 n.2 (2014) (Sanctuary concerns “the custom or privilege by which 
certain inviolable places become a recognized refuge for persons in danger” (citing 
M.M. Sheehan, Asylum, Right of, in I NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 994 (1967))). 
28. See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous
Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 759 (1986). 
29. Davidson, supra note 27, at 588.
30. Id. at 588 n.41 (citing NORMAN M. TRENHOLME, THE RIGHT OF SANCTUARY IN
ENGLAND: A STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11 (Frank Thilly ed., 1903)). 
31. See id. at 590–91.
32. See id. (noting that renouncing the realm of England resulted in a
forfeiture of all property to the Crown). 
33. Medeiros & Garnett McKenzie, supra note 25.
34. See id. at 20–21.
35. See Michael Scott Feeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented
in the American Context, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV 801, 810 (1990). 
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Carro, supra note 28, at 766.
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crime control, but rather the prevention of Roman Catholics from 
seeking refuge from the mandatory Anglicization of their 
churches.39 In 1540, Parliament passed a statute that prohibited 
sanctuary for those who had committed murder, rape, burglary, 
arson, or sacrilege.40 By 1623, the privilege of sanctuary was 
abolished entirely due to the Crown’s inability to prosecute political 
enemies.41 But even though sanctuary as a legal procedure has since 
remained outlawed, the use of sanctuary to provide protection to 
those most vulnerable has continued to this day.42 Mainly, this has 
occurred because the practice of the early Church “brought to light 
the notion of sanctuary as a sacred and moral duty” among that 
church’s followers.43 
III. HISTORY OF THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
IN THE 1980S AND WAYS IN WHICH SANCTUARY HAS SHAPED THE 
CURRENT NATIONAL IMMIGRATION DEBATE
A. The Refugee Act of 1980 and Its Role in the Rise of the 
Sanctuary Movement in the United States 
The Sanctuary Movement began shortly after Congress passed 
the Refugee Act of 1980.44 The Act had two main purposes: “to 
respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in 
their homelands,”45 and “to provide a permanent and systematic 
procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States.”46 Congress 
39. See Pamela Begaj, An Analysis of Historical and Legal Sanctuary and a Cohesive
Approach to the Current Movement, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 141 (2008) (noting that 
“although sanctuary was formally abolished in the first half of the sixteenth century, 
the practice continued in England well into the middle of the eighteenth century” 
(citing HERMAN BIANCHI, JUSTICE AS SANCTUARY: TOWARD A NEW SYSTEM OF CRIME
CONTROL 143 (1994))). 
40. See Carro, supra note 28, at 766.
41. See Kathleen L. Villarruel, The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary
Movement: A Comparison of History, Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 
1432–33 (1987).   
42. See Medeiros & Garnett McKenzie, supra note 25.
43. Id.
44. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102, 102–18 (1980)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157–59 (2012)); Altemus, supra note 24, at 
684. 
45. § 101(a), 94 Stat. at 102.  
46. § 101(b), 94 Stat. at 102. 
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accomplished the first purpose by amending the Immigration Act of 
1952 to prohibit the deportation of refugees to their home country 
if they met the statutory definition of “refugee.”47 The second 
purpose was met by a new provision in the Immigration Act that 
recognized asylum as a legal concept for the first time in United 
States law and established a single asylum procedure.48 
Before the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980, United States 
refugee law was overtly political. For example, the law required that 
refugees come from either Communist countries or the Middle East, 
and any exceptions required the United States Attorney General to 
exercise his or her discretionary parole authority.49 The Act tried to 
implement a more just system by incorporating the definition of 
“refugee” used by the United Nations—anyone with a “well-founded 
fear of persecution” based on “race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”50 
The Act was intended to prevent persecution, but it soon 
became clear that its implementation was not justly extended to all 
refugees.51 The law referred to the admission of refugees “of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States,” thus enabling the 
government to give preferences to certain refugee groups over 
others.52 Further, according to the operating instructions that 
accompanied the new procedures, applicants from the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Bloc countries received immediate action, while 
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (explaining that a refugee is “any
person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable 
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion”). 
 48. § 208(a), 94 Stat. at 105 (stating that the “Attorney General shall establish 
a procedure for an alien . . . to apply for asylum”); see S. REP. NO. 96–256, at 9 (1979), 
as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 155–56 (“This bill requires the Attorney 
General to establish a uniform procedure for passing upon an asylum 
application.”); Altemus, supra note 24, at 691–92, 692 n.58 (“Prior to the passage of 
the Refugee Act of 1980, the word ‘asylum’ did not even appear in the United States 
immigration laws.”). 
49. See ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND
LAW IN COLLISION 20 (1988). 
50. Id. (noting that this language originated with the 1951 United Nations
Refugee Convention). 
51. See Altemus, supra note 24, at 683–84 (excluding Salvadorans and
Guatemalans). 
52. CRITTENDEN, supra note 49.
8
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applicants from other countries did not.53 Most importantly, the Act 
failed nationals of Central America—primarily those from El 
Salvador and Guatemala—in two significant ways. First, the U.N. 
definition adopted by United States law excluded people displaced by 
military operations, civil strife, or natural disasters.54 As a result, 
many Salvadorans failed to meet the legal definition of refugee 
because they were considered to be fleeing a generalized climate of 
terror and violence rather than any specific threats to their lives.55 
Second, whereas under the previous system the United States had 
the luxury of screening potential refugees prior to admission, the 
new law failed to foresee the possibility that refugees were likely to 
be physically at the border rather than at refugee camps thousands 
of miles away.56 This possibility was not fully considered by the 
United States.57 Almost as an afterthought, the new law allowed for 
a discretionary asylum process: the United States Attorney General 
was required to establish a procedure for those in the United States 
or at the border to apply for and to be granted asylum only if they 
were deemed to fall within the refugee definition.58 
Within the first six months of the passage of the 1980 Act, more 
than 100,000 claims for asylum were filed.59 With a new Republican 
team in the Justice Department, it became easy to dismiss Central 
American refugees as “economic” refugees.60 From May 1983 to 
September 1986, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
noted that over 23% of asylum cases were approved.61 But, of the 
nearly 20,000 asylum applications filed by nationals of El Salvador, 
only 528 (2.6%) were approved,62 and of the nearly 1,500 asylum 
53. See id. at 20–22.




58. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 208, 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (stating that the “Attorney General 
shall establish” an asylum procedure that allows the Attorney General to use 
“discretion” to determine “that such an alien is a refugee within the meaning of 
section 101(a)(42)(A)”); CRITTENDEN, supra note 49, at 22. 
59. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 49, at 23.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 21.
62. See id.
9
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applications filed by nationals of Guatemala, only 14 (0.9%) were 
approved.63 
In response to what was perceived as an unfair application of 
the law to nationals of El Salvador and Guatemala, several churches 
and private individuals established a network determined to offer 
assistance to immigrants who had been denied asylum.64 This 
network was “originally conceived by Reverend Jim Fife, a minister 
of the Southside United Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona, 
and Jim Corbett, a retired Quaker cattle rancher.”65 Fife’s church 
began offering weekly prayer vigils, which later became a place for 
immigration lawyers and refugees to discuss legal issues and 
options.66 In the months leading up to its official declaration as the 
Sanctuary Movement, the Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force 
galvanized to “harness and direct a response of faith at all levels” to 
the plight of Central American refugees in the United States.67 This 
response included, among other things, a formal proclamation of 
biblically-based motivation, a weekly ecumenical prayer service 
outside the federal building housing the INS offices, the expansion 
of community-based legal services to assist Central American 
refugees, and the raising of over $750,000 for bonds and legal 
expenses.68 
At first, the Church’s role prior to the emergence of the 
Sanctuary Movement was similar to that of the biblical sanctuaries: 
they provided an alternative, but co-existing, source of charity to that 
which the secular community could provide or would approve.69 The 
Task Force raised nearly $750,000 in bonds and up to $100,000 in 
legal expenses and assisted Central American refugees in the filing 
of their asylum applications.70 Soon, however, the Task Force 
realized its efforts were futile, as most of the asylum applications it 
filed were ultimately denied.71 This moment was a crucial turning 
63. See id.
64. See Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 140
(2008). 
65. IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL
AMERICAN REFUGEES 10 (1985). 
66. See id.
67. HILARY CUNNINGHAM, GOD AND CAESAR AND THE RIO GRANDE 18 (1995).
68. See id.
69. See Sophie H. Pirie, The Origins of a Political Trial: The Sanctuary Movement
and Political Justice, 2 YALE J.L. & HUM. 381, 397 (1990). 
70. See Bau, supra note 65.
71. See id.
10
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point in the movement’s history.72 It transitioned from working 
within the law to exploring more options that posed higher legal 
risks.73 As Fife would later say, “If you hear from INS that what those 
church people ought to do is try to work within the law first, we did 
it. And we did it with as much energy and imagination and creativity 
as we could.”74  
Jim Corbett encouraged Fife and the rest of the Task Force to 
do more.75 He had already filled his own house and the houses of 
other Quakers with refugees.76 Now, he was asking Fife’s church to 
do the same.77 At first, members of the congregation volunteered to 
take refugees into their homes.78 Soon thereafter, members of the 
church were transporting refugees away from the border, then from 
the border to the church, and finally from across the United 
States-Mexico border.79 It was then that Fife decided to publicly 
declare sanctuary as a way to give “public witness” to what the group 
was doing.80 This public declaration, officially known as the 
Sanctuary Movement, took place on March 24, 1982, before eight 
television cameras and forty local, national, and international 
reporters.81   
The movement spread quickly and vastly, reaching all four 
corners of America—from Seattle to San Diego, and from Vermont 
to Florida.82 Within its first year, there were 45 sanctuary sites and 
72. See Jim Wallis & Joyce Hollyday, Conspiracy of Compassion: Four Indicted
Leaders Discuss the Sanctuary Movement, SOJOURNERS, Mar. 1985, at 16. 
73. See id.
74. Id.





80. Wallis & Hollyday, supra note 72, at 17.
81. See Altemus, supra note 24, at 684 n.7 (describing the Sanctuary Movement
as “(1) a justice ministry offer of refuge to persons fleeing persecution; (2) a public 
declaration of a church or synagogue against the policies of (INS) and the policy of 
investigation in Central America; (3) an opportunity to enlighten citizens of the 
United States about the plight of thousands of their fellow human beings; and (4) 
a demonstration of faith in action”). After several months of trying to keep their 
sanctuary efforts a secret, a dissenting member of the Southside Presbyterian 
Church leaked the information to the FBI. CRITTENDEN, supra note 49, at 70–71. As 
it turned out, the early publicity attracted far more attention than the simple 
announcement itself ever could have. Id.  
82. See Bau, supra note 65, at 12.
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600 supporting congregations and religious organizations across the 
country.83 By the end of the fall of 1983, the number of sanctuary 
sites throughout America rose to almost 70,84 and by the summer of 
1984 grew to more than 150, with thousands of individuals 
committed to the movement.85 
The Sanctuary Movement had four central themes. The first was 
a ministry of hospitality, providing physical security and services to 
Central American refugees.86 This included both the traditional 
roles of the Church—sheltering the homeless and feeding the 
hungry—but it also included providing legal services (money for 
bail, legal assistance for deportation proceedings, and preparation 
of asylum applications), social services (such as food, medical 
assistance, and shelter), and evasion services (transportation and 
resettlement).87 To these sanctuary churches, it seemed only natural 
that doors open to the most needy Americans should also be open 
to Central American refugees.88 
The second theme was to create a social justice ministry among 
member congregations—a new type of activism.89 This included a 
rediscovering of a biblical tradition that sought justice and peace as 
concrete elements of Christianity.90 This re-imagining fostered new 
channels of dialogue and communication; it opened congregations 
for meeting spaces, bringing lay professionals like lawyers, doctors, 
and social workers within the congregation into the life and ministry 
of the church.91 It even welcomed those outside the congregation 
into the life and ministry of the church.92 But most importantly, 
congregations were encouraged to examine their place in the 
larger Sanctuary Movement and decide their degree of 
involvement—either as an “immediate sanctuary” congregation that 
provided direct services (such as shelter) or as a “secondary 
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. (recognizing the June 1984 list of sanctuary sites compiled by the
Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (citing Charles Austin, More 
Churches Join in Offering Sanctuary for Latin Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1983, at 
A18)).  
86. See id.
87. See id. at 13.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 14.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 15.
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sanctuary” congregation that provided a wide variety of support 
services (such as money, food, clothing, furniture, transportation, 
volunteers, or education).93 
The third theme emphasized by the Sanctuary Movement 
concerned the emerging role of the Church in politics.94 
Congregations were encouraged to engage in larger debates and 
discussions about the relationship between Church and State.95 This 
was particularly important, as it was the Reagan administration that 
increased military spending and continued to pursue a nuclear arms 
race that provoked an unprecedented degree of organizing and 
demonstrating by churchgoers.96 
The fourth theme of the Sanctuary Movement was the call to 
protest United States foreign policies in Central America that 
resulted in the influx of Central American refugees in the first 
place.97 Requiring each congregation that joined the movement to 
make a public statement of its intent,98 members of the Sanctuary 
Movement declared the current United States policy in Central 
America illegal and immoral.99 These members also stated that they 
would continue to extend sanctuary to the victims of the policy so 
long as it remained in place.100 But protests by members of the 
Sanctuary Movement go far beyond mere civil disobedience. As Jim 
Corbett said: 
[S]anctuary also begins where war resistance played out, 
with community conversion. Civil disobedience is often 
understood . . . to be individualistic resistance to state-
enforced injustice, but the declaration of sanctuary is a 
different kind of civil disobedience that is intended to do 
justice. Individuals can resist injustice, but only 
communities can choose to do justice.101 
93. See id.




98. See Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Babino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime
of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 133 (1993). 
99. See Kara L. Wild, The New Sanctuary Movement: When Moral Mission Means
Breaking the Law, and the Consequences for Churches and Illegal Immigrants, 50 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 981, 988 (2010). 
100. See id. 
 101. Bau, supra note 65, at 21 (quoting Jim Corbett from an unpublished paper 
titled Sanctuary and the Covenant Community). 
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B. Federal Prosecution of Members of the Sanctuary Movement 
Initially, the federal government dismissed the activities of the 
Sanctuary Movement as a ploy for publicity.102 While congregations 
and individuals engaged in sanctuary activity for many months, 
neither the Department of Justice nor the INS sought to prosecute 
congregations that were part of the movement.103 But as its 
membership grew to over 100 congregations and 30,000 
participants, tensions between Church and State also grew.104 It was 
only a matter of time before the federal government stepped in.105 
And so in 1984, as part of an undercover operation called 
“Operation Sojourner,” the INS authorized four undercover agents 
wearing “body bugs” to enter churches and tape private 
congregations, tap telephones, photocopy documents, gather 
personal information, and report regularly to the United States 
government.106 This investigation led to the indictment of sixteen 
people on January 14, 1985, and the arrest of more than sixty people 
on charges involving smuggling, transporting, and concealing 
“illegal aliens”107 under various provisions of section 274 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)—particularly its 
anti-harboring and anti-transporting provisions.108 This case, United 
States v. Aguilar,109 would become the most critical of all the 
Sanctuary Movement cases110 and would later be called by the chief 
federal prosecutor the “death knell” of the Sanctuary Movement.111 
102. See Altemus, supra note 24, at 704. 
103. See id. at 704–05. 
104. See id. at 684. 
105. See id.   
106. Id. at 711. 
107. See id. at 710. 
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2000); see BAU, supra note 65, at 75–123. 
109. 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989). 
110. This was not the first, but the fifth case for smuggling, harboring, or 
concealing an illegal alien. In the first, Stacey Merkt was charged with transporting 
two undocumented refugees within the United States. Altemus, supra note 24, at 
705–06. In the second case, Phillip Willis-Conger and Katherine Flaherty were 
detained for transporting four Salvadoran refugees within the United States. Id. at 
707. In the third, Jack Elder was charged with unlawful transportation of three 
Salvadorans to a bus station. Id. at 708. In the fourth, both Elder and Merkt were 
charged with smuggling, transporting, and conspiracy after transporting two 
Salvadorans across the border. Id. at 709. 
111. See Loken & Babino, supra note 98, at 121. 
14
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss3/3
2018] SANCTUARY & HARBORING IN TRUMP’S AMERICA 883 
The Sanctuary Movement prosecutions were based as much on 
the media’s characterization of the movement’s activities as “illegal” 
as the actual assistance to Central American refugees.112 In Aguilar, 
the government asked the trial court to preclude four separate 
defenses from being raised in any form: defenses based on 
international law, freedom of religion, law of necessity, and lack of 
specific criminal intent.113 The government saw the movement as 
nothing more than an alien smuggling ring and argued that it was 
irrelevant and prejudicial to reference refugees, international law, 
conditions in Central America, freedom of religion, humanitarian 
assistance, asylum, or a necessity defense.114 Of particular challenge 
to the defendants was the decision to either justify their actions as 
legal under existing law or to admit the illegality of their conduct but 
justify it on traditional civil disobedience grounds.115 The defendants 
chose to argue the legality of their actions, a move that would later 
define the movement’s future relationship with the law.116 
There were several defenses raised, including: (1) the belief that 
the sanctuary workers did not commit a crime because the refugees 
they assisted were entitled to enter and reside in the United States 
under the Refugee Act of 1980;117 (2) the conduct of the workers was 
protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment;118 
and (3) the actions of the workers did not fall within the definition 
of harboring under the INA.119 One by one, the courts rejected these 
defenses, but one argument was not rejected outright—that the 
anti-harboring provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) were not meant to 
criminalize the mere sheltering of undocumented refugees, absent 
a specific intent to help them evade detection.120 This one small 
victory offered a glimmer of hope for the movement’s future 
endeavors and validated the goal of establishing sanctuary as a civic 
 112. See Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of 
Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 946–47 (1995). 
 113. See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury—A 
Government’s Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 49 (1986). 
114. See id. at 52. 
115. See Loken & Babino, supra note 98, at 137. 
116. See id. 
117. See Brief for the Appellants at 182, United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 
(9th Cir. 1989). 
118. See id. at 257–302. 
119. See id. at 55–70. 
120. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 689–90 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 
Loken & Babino, supra note 98, at 140–41. 
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duty rather than a crime.121 This effectively met the primary purpose 
of the movement to provide non-clandestine shelter to those most 
vulnerable to deportation.122 
The efforts of the religious communities involved in the 
Sanctuary Movement sparked debate over America’s human, ethical, 
and moral responsibilities in light of the mistreatment of Central 
Americans under the Refugee Act of 1980. The movement raised 
serious questions about the depths to which Americans will go, both 
individually and collectively, to respond to injustice. By the end of 
the movement, the public debates sparked by the efforts helped 
bring about several major changes in immigration law and policy. 
Significantly, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986123 
provided amnesty and the opportunity to become lawful permanent 
residents to over 2.5 million undocumented immigrants.124  
IV. HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED LIABILITY UNDER THE ANTI-
HARBORING PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1324 OF THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY ACT
With an administration that has made enforcement of 
immigration laws one of its top priorities,125 many congregations 
across the United States are once again discerning their role in 
offering sanctuary to undocumented immigrants.126 Aware of the 
need to revive many of the sanctuary activities of the earlier 
movement, the prevalent issue these congregations must face is 
whether to provide shelter, arguably the most significant activity of 
121. See Loken & Babino, supra note 98, at 141. 
122. See id. 
123. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 
100 Stat. 3359, 3359–3445 (1986). The Act required employers to attest to their 
employees’ immigration status, made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire 
undocumented immigrants, permitted certain undocumented seasonal agricultural 
workers, and legalized over 2.5 million immigrants who entered the United States 
before January 1, 1982. Id.  
124. See Betsy Cooper & Kevin O’Neil, Lessons from the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2005), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/PolicyBrief_No
3_Aug05.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R3R-P7T2].  
 125. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, In Capitol Hill Meetings, Donald Trump Reveals His 
Top Priorities, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/polit 
ics/congress/capitol-hill-meetings-donald-trump-reveals-his-top-priorities-n682211 
[http://perma.cc/8KRL-S74U]. 
126. See Borter, supra note 17. 
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the original movement. While there is no law that specifically 
prohibits a faith congregation from responding to the needs of 
undocumented immigrants at their doors, the question at hand is 
whether—and how—a congregation may do so without violating the 
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A), which prohibit the bringing 
in and “harboring” of noncitizens who are not lawfully present in the 
United States.127 In order to understand the anti-harboring provision 
of section 1324, it helps to look at the language of the statute, and 
how the anti-harboring provision falls within the larger context of 
the other violations listed in the statute.  
Section 1324 makes any person—individual or corporate—
guilty of a crime who: 
(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts 
to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever 
such person at a place other than a designated port of entry 
or place other than as designated by the Commissioner, 
regardless of whether such alien has received prior official 
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United 
States and regardless of any future official action which may 
be taken with respect to such alien; 
(ii) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an 
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States 
in violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to 
transport or move such alien within the United States by 
means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of 
such violation of law; 
(iii) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an 
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States 
in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from 
detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from 
detection, such alien in any place, including any building 
or any means of transportation; [or] 
(iv) encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or 
reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless 
disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or 
residence is or will be in violation of law.128 
The progression of this statute—starting with “bringing a 
non-citizen into the United States by undesignated port of entry” 
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 128. Id. (emphasis added). A person also commits a crime who “engages in any 
conspiracy to commit any of [these] preceding acts, or aids or abets the commission 
of any of [these] preceding acts.” Id. at § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v). 
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and moving to “transporting,” then to “conceal[ing], harbor[ing], 
or shield[ing],” and finally to “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]”—is a 
progression from concrete and specific conduct to more nebulous 
and ambiguous conduct, and matches the undocumented person’s 
unlawful journey in the United States. It also aligns with the 
historical development of the statute, as only cross-border 
infiltration and smuggling were initially prohibited, followed by the 
more nebulous conduct of “harboring,” “encouraging,” and 
“inducing” being added to the list of prohibited conduct by later 
amendments.129 The closer to an illegal border crossing one gets, the 
more clearly the conduct is unlawful. Assisting someone in making 
an illegal border crossing is clearly prohibited by this statute.130 
Transporting from the border to points interior in a way that is 
intended to avoid detection by the authorities is also illegal.131 While 
“concealing” and “shielding from detection” are relatively clear and 
concrete concepts, the same is not true of “harboring.”132 What 
exactly does it mean to “harbor?” How should this third category of 
unlawful conduct be read? And what does it mean to “encourage or 
induce” someone to enter or reside in the United States?   
While courts have interpreted “harboring” under section 1324 
in a variety of ways, the central issue these courts have contended 
with is whether “harboring” requires the government to prove an 
element of clandestine sheltering or concealment in addition to 
some other act that substantially furthers an undocumented alien’s 
unlawful presence in the United States.133 As detailed further in this 
article,134 the first two courts interpreting the term—the Sixth 
Circuit in 1928 and the Second Circuit in 1940—found an 
unmistakable element of concealment or prevention of detection in 
Congress’ intent.135 The Second Circuit dropped that element in a 
129. See id. at § 1324(a)(1)(A). 
130. See United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 295–96 (S.D. Fla. 1980).  
131. See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1045–47 (7th Cir. 2012). 
132. See id.  
133. An act that substantially furthers an undocumented alien’s presence 
includes sheltering. See United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940); 
Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928). 
134. Infra Part IV.A. 
 135. See Susnjar, 27 F.2d at 224 (explaining that within the context of the statute, 
“the natural meaning of the word ‘harbor’ [is] to clandestinely shelter, succor, and 
protect improperly admitted aliens, and that the word ‘conceal’ should be taken in 
the simple sense of shielding from observation and preventing discovery of such 
alien persons”); Mack, 112 F.2d at 291 (“[T]he statute is very plainly directed against 
18
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1975 case.136 A minority of circuits followed this decision relatively 
reflexively by formally omitting concealment as an element, while 
essentially affirming only those cases where concealment or 
prevention of discovery was a factor.137 In 2013, the Second Circuit 
revisited its prior decision, scrutinized Congressional intent (as well 
as its own case law), and returned to its original conclusion that 
harboring must contain an element of concealment.138 The same 
year, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner authored an opinion 
based on a comparable depth of analysis that reached a similar, if 
somewhat idiosyncratic, conclusion.139 The Sixth Circuit never 
abandoned the concealment element, and a majority of circuits, 
including those which have given the harboring question the most 
thorough examination, now read the harboring statute to require 
it.140 To understand how the term is likely to be applied today, it 
helps to look more closely at its history. 
A. History of the Harboring Element 
The INA was enacted in 1907.141 In its first iteration, the statute 
simply prohibited the smuggling or bringing of unlawful aliens into 
the United States.142 The statute was amended in 1917 “to add as a 
crime the concealment or harboring of illegal aliens,” but Congress 
those who abet evaders of the law against unlawful entry, as the collocation of 
‘conceal’ and ‘harbor’ shows. Indeed, the word, ‘harbor’ alone often connotes 
surreptitious concealment.”).  
 136. United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 440–41 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding 
harboring “was intended to encompass conduct tending substantially to facilitate an 
alien’s ‘remaining in the United States illegally’”).   
137. See United States v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366, 382 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 138. See id. (“The mere act of providing shelter to an alien, when done without 
intention to help prevent the alien’s detection by immigration authorities or police, 
is thus not an offense under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).”). 
139. See Cruz v. Abbott, 849 F.3d 594, 600 (5th Cir. 2017) (“This court interprets 
the words ‘harbor, shield, or conceal,’ which appear in a federal immigration 
statute, to mean that ‘something is being hidden from detection.’”); United States 
v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1048 (7th Cir. 2012). In Cruz, the court acknowledged
that other circuits have interpreted similar language to suggest that something is 
being hidden from detection. Cruz, 849 F.3d at 601 (referencing the 7th Circuit’s 
interpretation of “harbor” in Vargas-Cordon). 
 140. The legislative history of the anti-harboring statute is discussed in Lopez, 
521 F.2d at 437, Costello, 666 F.3d at 1040, and Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 366. 
 141. Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59–96, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 898; see 
Lopez, 521 F.2d at 437. 
142. Ch. 1134, 34 Stat. at 898; see Lopez, 521 F.2d at 439. 
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neglected to define “harbor.”143 In 1928, the Sixth Circuit was the 
first court to interpret what Congress meant by “harboring.”144 In 
Susnjar v. United States, the court noted that one of the “principal 
objects” of the Immigration Act of 1917 was “to exclude from the 
country all aliens who have unlawfully succeeded in effecting an 
entry.”145 Interpreting the term in light of that purpose, the court 
concluded “the natural meaning of the word ‘harbor’ to be to 
clandestinely shelter, succor, and protect improperly admitted 
aliens, and that the word ‘conceal’ should be taken in the simple 
sense of shielding from observation and preventing discovery of such 
alien persons.”146 Judge Learned Hand, in a 1940 Second Circuit 
opinion, likewise read the statute to impart an element of 
concealment into the crime of “harboring.”147 He wrote that “the 
statute is very plainly directed against those who abet evaders of the 
law against unlawful entry, as the collocation of ‘conceal’ and 
‘harbor’ shows. Indeed, the word ‘harbor’ alone often connotes 
surreptitious concealment.”148 
 The Second Circuit revisited this conclusion thirty-five years 
later in United States v. Lopez.149 During that interim, the statute had 
undergone a change.150 The 1917 amendment added the crimes of 
“concealment” and “harboring,” but failed to extend the statute’s 
penalty provisions to that conduct.151 The Supreme Court addressed 
this discrepancy in United States v. Evans.152 The Court held that 
resolving the discrepancy would require it to go beyond its 
constitutional role of interpreting the law and into the territory of 
writing it.153 The Court noted that not only was the Act unclear as to 
whether Congress intended to penalize concealing and harboring 
conduct, but it was also unclear whether “the addition of concealing 
or harboring was meant to be limited to those acts only when closely 
 143. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64–301, 39 Stat. 874, 898; Lopez, 521 
F.2d at 439.   
144. Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928). 
145. Id. at 224.   
146. Id. 
147. United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940). 
148. Id.  
149. 521 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1975).   
150. See id. at 439.   
151. Id.   
152. 333 U.S. 483 (1948).   
153. See id. at 489.   
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connected with bringing in or landing, so as to make a chain of 
offenses consisting of successive stages in the smuggling process.”154  
In 1952, Congress amended the statute once again, codifying it 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1324, and adding penalty provisions for “harboring,” 
but once again declined to define the term.155  Congress also added 
the language “preventing aliens from entering or remaining in the 
United States illegally.”156 This additional term—”or remaining”—
proved significant when the Second Circuit concluded that it showed 
Congress’ intent to clarify that conduct could violate the anti-
harboring provisions even if it was not directly connected to the 
smuggling process.157 Despite the absence of legislative history or 
statutory text indicating that Congress intended harboring to not 
include clandestine intent, the court departed from its prior holding 
in United States v. Mack and adopted a new definition of harboring 
that omitted concealment: 
Although our task would have been lightened if Congress 
had expressly defined the word “harbor,” we are persuaded 
by the language and background of the revision of the 
statute that the term was intended to encompass conduct tending 
substantially to facilitate an alien’s “‘remaining in the United 
States illegally,’” provided, of course, the person charged has 
knowledge of the alien’s unlawful status.158 
Lopez was a highly influential decision, and all circuits have since 
incorporated its “substantial facilitation of remaining illegally” 
concept into their definitions of “harboring.”159  In fact, some 
circuits used the “substantial facilitation” language in Lopez to 
154. Id. 
 155. Immigration Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–283, ch. 108, 66 Stat. 26, 27; see 
also Lopez, 521 F.2d at 440.   
156. Ch. 108, 66 Stat. at 26 (emphasis added); see Lopez, 521 F.2d at 440.   
157. See Lopez, 521 F.2d at 441 (noting the legislative history contained “no 
suggestion that only conduct forming part of the smuggling process should be 
proscribed”). 
158. Id. at 440–41 (emphasis added). 
 159. See, e.g., United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 2008) (harboring 
“encompasses conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien’s remaining in the 
United States illegally” (quoting United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 
1999))); see also United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(harboring encompasses activity “tending substantially to facilitate an alien’s 
‘remaining in the United States illegally’” (quoting Lopez, 521 F.2d at 441)); United 
States v. Khamani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]ny knowing conduct 
by the defendant tending to substantially facilitate an alien’s escaping detection as 
an illegal alien, thereby remaining in the United States illegally.”). 
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eliminate any requirement of concealment or other clandestine 
activity or intent from at least the formal definition of “harboring.” 
The most significant of these decisions was United States v. Acosta de 
Evans, decided one year later, where the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
Lopez to reject the “interpretation of harbor as clandestine 
sheltering.”160 The court “constru[ed] ‘harbor’ to mean ‘afford 
shelter to,’” or “simple sheltering,” without any concealment 
required.161   
Thus, Acosta de Evans became an opinion cited by other circuits 
as authority to support the elimination of clandestine purpose. For 
example, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the idea that 
“harboring” must involve actions intended to inhibit government 
detection.162 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit concluded that harboring 
“does not require proof of secrecy or concealment.”163 But the Fifth 
Circuit at least attempted to find justification for this interpretation 
in the language of the statute:   
We believe that by referring to “harbor,” “conceal” and 
“shield from detection” Congress intended to broadly 
proscribe any knowing or willful conduct fairly within any 
of these terms that tends to substantially facilitate an alien’s 
remaining in the United States illegally, rather than to 
create a series of three separate offenses each contained in 
its own distinct watertight compartment.164 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has not attempted such statutory 
interpretation, relying instead on cases like Acosta de Evans.165 But 
this is not the only, nor even the most coherent, way to interpret 
“conceals, harbors, or shields from detection,” as explained below.166 
Together, these circuits reduced the definition of “harboring” to a 
minimal showing of “substantially facilitat[ing] an alien’s remaining 
in the United States illegally.”167   
160. 531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976).   
161. Id.  
162. See United States v. de Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Valerio–Santibanez, 81 F. App’x. 836, 837 (5th Cir. 2003). 
163. United States v. Rushing, 313 F.3d 428, 434 (8th Cir. 2002).  
164. United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.5 (1982). 
165. See Rushing, 313 F.3d at 434. 
166. Infra Parts IV.B, IV.C, V. 
167. See, e.g., Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d at 1073.   
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B. Problems with the “Substantially Facilitate” Definition of Harboring 
There are significant problems with this formulation as a 
standalone definition. First, if Congress intended “harbor” to 
include any conduct that merely substantially facilitates a person 
illegally present in the United States to remain so, then why did it 
choose a term loaded with clandestine connotations and not a more 
straightforward term like “assist” or “aid”? And if Congress intended 
the word “harbor” to criminalize any conduct that substantially 
facilitated a person’s continued unlawful presence in the United 
States—rather than only such conduct that is intended to prevent 
the detection or apprehension of such person—then why did it 
sandwich the word between two types of conduct that explicitly mean 
hiding? Would not this broad and generic definition of “harbor” 
nullify the presence of “conceal” and “shield from detection” in the 
sentence? Concealing and shielding an undocumented person from 
detection is undoubtedly conduct that would substantially further 
the continued illegal presence of that person in the United States, 
but so is a broad spectrum of conduct having nothing to do at all 
with concealment or shielding from detection.  
Second, the “substantially facilitate” definition, by itself, is so 
vague that it does not provide courts—let alone individuals—with 
much guidance on the kind of conduct that constitutes illegal 
harboring. For example, if all it takes to commit a crime is to 
“substantially facilitate” a person’s remaining in the United States 
illegally by providing simple sheltering, then does a homeless shelter 
commit a crime by giving a homeless immigrant family a bed, a meal, 
and roof over their heads? Does an emergency room commit a crime 
by admitting and keeping overnight a seriously injured or ill person 
who lacks requisite authorization? Clearly not. 
In the early 2010s, three circuits detected the defects in this 
definition of harboring and sought to correct them. These courts 
rejected the conclusion that simple sheltering could violate the 
INA’s anti-harboring provision and affirmed that “harboring” 
requires some additional element of concealment or protection 
from discovery.168 In Delrio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties, the Third 
Circuit affirmed its test for “harboring,” requiring “some act of 
obstruction that reduces the likelihood the government will discover 
 168. As discussed above, the Sixth Circuit never questioned whether conduct 
could be harboring if it lacked an element of secrecy or concealment. See Susnjar v. 
United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928). 
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the alien’s presence.”169 The Third Circuit acknowledged that some 
circuits—such as the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh—“have defined 
‘harboring’ more broadly than we have . . . [and] have found 
defendants to be guilty of harboring in a variety of situations.”170 
However, those decisions “involved defendants who failed to make 
necessary state and federal employment-related disclosures, were 
involved in smuggling undocumented individuals into this country, 
attempted to warn undocumented individuals of the presences of 
law enforcement authorities, and/or provided specific assistance in 
obtaining false documents.”171 The Third Circuit determined that 
no court of appeals “has held that knowingly renting an apartment 
to an alien lacking lawful immigration status constitutes 
harboring . . . . [S]uch conduct does not constitute the type of 
‘substantial facilitation’ that we require to make out a harboring 
offense.”172 Merely “[r]enting an apartment in the normal course of 
business is not in and of itself conduct that prevents the government 
from detecting an alien’s presence.”173   
In 2012, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in the 
case United States v. Costello, subjected the question of how to 
interpret harboring to a more intensive analysis and reached a 
similar, albeit idiosyncratic, definition.174 He observed that 
“harboring” has a connotation of “deliberately safeguarding 
members of a specified group from the authorities, whether through 
concealment, movement to a safe location, or physical 
protection.”175 As such, the term “harboring” goes beyond the terms 
“sheltering” and “giv[es] a person a place to stay.”176 Judge Posner 
noted that Black’s Law Dictionary from 1910 defined “harboring” as 
“[t]o receive clandestinely and without lawful authority a person for 
the purpose of so concealing him that another having a right to the 
 169. 672 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 
F.3d 170, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 170. Id. (citing Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Xiong Hui Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 417–18 (7th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Singh, 261 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2001)).
171. Id. at 247.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 246 (citing Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 223 (3d Cir.
2010)). 
174. 666 F.3d 1040, 1043–45 (7th Cir. 2012). 
175. Id. at 1044. 
176. Id.  
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lawful custody of such person shall be deprived of the same.”177 Both 
the Sixth Circuit’s 1922 Susjnar and the Second Circuit’s 1940 Mack 
cases, discussed above, likewise expressly include this clandestine 
element.178   
This century-old definition, which includes both clandestine 
conduct and the purpose of preventing a person from being 
detected or apprehended by lawful authority, comports with the 
common statutory meaning of harboring (i.e., harboring a fugitive). 
In fact, Posner observed that the definitions of “harboring” in other 
parts of the federal criminal statutes explicitly include this element 
of secrecy.179 He noted that “harboring” a fugitive in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1071 means “to lodge, to care for after secreting the offender;”180 
and “harboring” a military deserter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1381 
means “providing lodging and care ‘after secreting the deserter.’”181   
Judge Posner then turned to the word as it is used in the INA to 
answer the question of what congress intended by placing the word 
“harbor” between “concealing” and “shielding from detection.”182 
Posner rejected as too vague the approach taken by some circuits of 
defining “harboring” merely as “substantial facilitation” of the 
immigrant’s continued illegal presence in the United States.183 He 
stated that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Acosta de Evans with the 
177. Id. at 1043. 
 178. Id. at 1048 (citing Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928); 
United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940)).   
179. See id. at 1049. 
180. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Foy, 416 F.2d 941, 941 (7th 
Cir. 1969)). 
 181. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Michael v. United States, 393 F.3d 22, 34 
(10th Cir. 1968)). 
182. Id. at 1046–47. 
 183. Id. at 1050 (citing United States v. Tipton, 518 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 99 (3d Cir. 2008)). This approach to 
harboring appears to devolve into the proverbial “obscenity” test of “you know it 
when you see it.” See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). For example, in United States v. Rushing, the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that giving someone known to have entered the United States illegally “a job and a 
place to live” and helping that person “receive medical care and banking privileges” 
was “more than enough to support a conviction for harboring an illegal alien.” 313 
F.3d 428, 434 (8th Cir. 2002). The court did not explain its reasoning for why or 
how that cluster of activity fell within the scope of conduct Congress intended to 
prohibit. Id. Nor did it attempt to explain what conduct was “just enough” to support 
a harboring conviction. Id. The only authority it cited was United States v. Acosta de 
Evans, 531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976).  
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meaning of “harboring” reduced to “simple sheltering” was a mistake 
and “unpersuasive.”184 Cases in other circuits where the court 
appeared to adopt a “simple sheltering” definition of “harboring” all 
turned on the fact that the defendants “did other things for the 
illegal alien besides providing a place to stay, such as employing him 
or helping him to obtain false documentation to conceal his illegal 
status.”185 In the one case where a defendant was prosecuted for 
merely cohabiting with an undocumented immigrant, the court of 
appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that cohabitation alone 
was insufficient to establish  harboring.186 Even the Ninth Circuit 
appeared to overturn Acosta de Evans in a much later case, approving 
a jury instruction for “harboring” that required proof that the 
defendant acted with the purpose of preventing detention of the 
illegal alien by immigration authorities.187   
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, which concluded that Congress 
intended to give harboring a broad, all-encompassing meaning 
unrelated to secrecy or concealment,188 Posner sought to determine 
Congress’ intent from the word’s placement and context.189 
Unfortunately, Posner did not himself provide a clear and workable 
definition of “harboring” to take the place of the vague and over-
encompassing definitions provided by other circuits. Harboring, 
Posner wrote, “can be given a meaning that plugs a possible loophole 
left open by merely forbidding, concealing, and shielding from 
detection.”190 Concealing is concealing.191 Shielding from detection 
is also concealing, but could involve non-physical methods of 
shielding from detection, such as bribing law enforcement to look 
the other way.192 Harboring, then, is some kind of obscuring conduct 
that is neither physical concealment nor non-physical shielding from 
detection. The problem with this loophole approach is that it forces 
Posner to try to articulate a definition of harboring that does not 
include concealment, which produces somewhat strained results.   
184. Costello, 666 F.3d at 1049. 
 185. Id. (citing United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Batjargal, 302 F. App’x. 188, 191 (4th Cir. 2008)).   
186. See id. at 1050 (citing United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1003–04 (3d 
Cir. 2008)). 
187. See id. (citing United States v. You, 382 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
188. See United States v. Singh, 261 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 2001). 
189. See Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044–45. 
190. Id. at 1045.  
191. See id. 
192. See id. 
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Consequently, Posner seems unable to settle on a definition of 
harboring that contains a concealment connotation but is not 
“concealment” or “shielding from detection.” In one place, Posner 
states that “harboring” means “materially to assist an alien to remain 
illegally in the United States without publicly advertising his 
presence but without needing or bothering to conceal it.”193 
Elsewhere, he says harboring is “providing . . . or offering . . . a 
known illegal alien a secure haven, a refuge, a place to stay in which 
the authorities are unlikely to be seeking him.”194 These definitions 
are theoretically reconcilable: a defendant would not need to 
conceal assistance given to an undocumented alien if the assistance 
was being provided in a place where it would be unlikely for the 
authorities to look for that alien. However, the definitions are still 
different, and one can imagine scenarios in which the conduct could 
fall into one definition but not the other. For example, a person 
might assist an alien to remain illegally in the United States without 
bothering to conceal it, even though authorities are likely to be 
looking for that alien. This might occur where a defendant provides 
sanctuary to undocumented person in a high-profile case that has 
been covered by the press. The outcome of such a case would 
depend on which of Posner’s definitions a court applied.  
There are other problems with Posner’s proposed definitions 
having to do with evidence and notice. How is a court, let alone a 
defendant, to know when one may avoid concealing assistance to an 
undocumented alien? How is one to know that the location or 
setting in which assistance is provided is one in which authorities are 
unlikely to be seeking the recipient of that assistance? Would a 
prosecution against an alleged harborer mean it was likely that the 
authorities had been seeking the undocumented immigrant and 
that the defendant therefore “needed to conceal” the assistance he 
or she was providing? And would the need to conceal the assistance 
mean the conduct was therefore not harboring? 
Another significant concern is that Posner’s proposed 
definition of harboring appears to depend on the discretion of 
enforcement authorities. In a hypothetical, Posner postulates a 
Chinese restaurant owner in Chinatown who employs known 
undocumented aliens because they are cheap labor.195 The owner 
193. Id. at 1047.  
194. Id. at 1050. 
195. See id. at 1045. 
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provides them with housing to make the employment more 
attractive, and because they lack documentation that other landlords 
would require of would-be renters.196 Posner states that this conduct 
would be harboring despite not needing any effort at concealment 
or shielding from detection, “simply because the immigration 
authorities, having very limited investigative resources, may have no 
interest in rooting out illegal aliens in Chinese restaurants in 
Chinatowns.”197   
The logic behind this theorizing is problematic. The purpose of 
discretion is to allow those with authority to enforce the law and to 
decide the offenses that should be prioritized given the 
circumstances.198 The factors typically considered in making such 
decisions include the seriousness of the alleged crime, the degree to 
which the alleged conduct reflects the kind of conduct Congress 
most clearly intended to prohibit, and the costs of attempting to 
enforce such conduct.199 The fact that an enforcement agency 
chooses not to enforce a particular conduct obviously does not mean 
that conduct is legal. But it would be an odd innovation if courts 
were to adopt a definition of harboring where an immigration 
agency’s decision not to investigate or enforce immigration law is the 
key fact that pushes a defendant’s conduct over the line into 
criminality. In addition to being logically inconsistent, such a 
definition could be unconstitutionally vague, failing to provide 
reasonable notice concerning what constitutes prohibited activity.200 
How is a citizen to know which factors an enforcement agency might 
196. See id.  
197. Id.  
198. See The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Authority to Prioritize Removal 
of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, 
38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download 
[https://perma.cc/8B7L-W5JD] [hereinafter Authority to Remove]; Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[T]he  agency must not only assess whether a 
violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation 
or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular 
enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, 
whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.”).  
199. See Authority to Remove, supra note 198, at 5–7. 
 200. See generally United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“The 
constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that [the] conduct is forbidden 
by the statute.”).  
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weigh in determining whether to enforce the law in a particular 
circumstance?  
But the problem with Posner’s definition is more fundamental 
than this, and it stems from his efforts to read “harbor” in a way that 
is not redundant to the other words chosen by Congress—words that 
essentially mean the same thing. The “loophole plug” theory would 
make more sense—though would still not be conclusive—if “harbor” 
came after “shield from detection.”201 In that case, one might be able 
to discern the intent of the drafters to progress from narrower, more 
specific language to broader, more general language, setting up 
three, successively wider nets: “shield from detection” to catch 
whatever slips through “conceal,” and “harbor” to catch whatever 
slips through “shield from detection.”202 But this is not how Congress 
wrote the statute. Instead, “harbor” is located between “conceal” and 
“shield from detection,”203 strongly suggesting that whatever 
harboring conduct is, it is closer to concealing than merely shielding 
from detection. Given this placement of the terms in the statute, it 
would be awkward syntax, to say the least, if Congress wrote a list of 
prohibited conduct and intended the first word to be the most 
specific type of prohibited conduct; the last word to be the second 
most specific type of prohibited conduct; and the middle word to be 
the most general, inclusive type of prohibited conduct.  
C. A Better Interpretation of Harboring 
To find a better reading of the harboring subparagraph, we 
return to the Second Circuit, the court that set so many other circuits 
down the wrong path with Lopez, and a 2013 case explicitly 
overturning that decision—United States v. Vargas-Cordon.204 
Nearly forty years after Lopez, the Second Circuit observed 
“there is no precedent binding us to a particular interpretation of 
‘harbors’ under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).”205 In a remark applicable to 
the approach to harboring by federal courts at large, the court 
stated, “Our case law has been inconsistent in describing the 
minimum conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under 
201. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
202. See id.  
203. See id.  
204. 733 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013).  
205. Id. at 380. 
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§ 1324.”206 Beginning with Mack, the Second Circuit noted its earliest
decisions in the 1940s “interpreted ‘harbors’ to connote an element 
of evading detection.”207 Thirty years later, the court “stated in two 
opinions,” Lopez and United States v. Herrera, “that harboring under 
§ 1324 ‘was intended to encompass conduct tending substantially to
facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United States illegally.’”208 
Twenty years after those cases, the Second Circuit has “revert[ed] to 
language consistent with our original discussions of the meaning of 
‘harbors’ as used in § 1324, affirm[ing] that harboring encompasses 
conduct which is intended to facilitate an alien’s remaining in the 
United States illegally and ‘to prevent government authorities from 
detecting [the alien’s] unlawful presence.’”209 The Second Circuit 
noted that “in our decisions arguably applying a broader conception 
of ‘harboring’ that does not require that a defendant aim to assist an 
alien in remaining undetected by authorities, the defendants did 
more than merely provide shelter.”210 In Lopez, the defendant 
arranged and provided for sham marriages to disguise the 
undocumented residents’ unlawful presence in the United States.211 
“In Herrera, the defendants had taken clear steps to prevent the 
detection of the unlawfully present aliens who worked in their 
brothel, including the installment of a video surveillance and alarm 
system designed to alert their employees whenever immigration 
officials approached the building.”212 
In seeking to resolve the inconsistencies in its own precedent, 
the Second Circuit queried “whether the language at issue has a 
plain and unambiguous meaning.”213 It acknowledged that “‘harbor’ 
may sometimes be synonymous with ‘shelter.’”214 However, unlike 
those courts that looked no further than this single meaning, the 
Second Circuit acknowledged that many of the term’s “common 
uses—for example, ‘harboring a fugitive’—also connote 
concealment.”215 Consequently, the court concluded that “the 
206. Id.   
207. See id. (citing United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1940)).   
208. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1144 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
209. Id. (citing United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
210. Id. 
211. See id.  
212. Id. (citing Herrera, 584 F.2d at 1141–42).  
213. Id. at 380–81.   
214. Id. at 381.  
215. Id.  
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ordinary meaning of ‘harbors,’ at least with respect to whether it 
entails avoiding detection, is unambiguous.”216 
Having determined the meaning of the term was clear, the court 
considered the placement of the term “harbors” in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).217 It observed that “conceals” and “shields from
detection” both “carry an obvious connotation of secrecy and 
hiding.”218 Applying the canon noscitur a sociis (i.e., the principle that 
a word is known by the company it keeps),219 the court determined 
that “as the third and only other term in subparagraph (A)(iii), 
[‘harbors’] also shares this connotation, which easily fits into its 
ordinary meaning.”220 Thus, rather than eliminate the most 
distinctive and common sense connotation of “harbor”—its 
association with concealment—in order to make it mean something 
other than “concealment” and “shielding from detection,” the 
Second Circuit took a more common sense and less convoluted 
approach.221 The Second Circuit concluded Congress chose that 
term and placed it among other terms connoting concealment in 
order to underscore that very connotation.222 
The Second Circuit also observed that Congress employed the 
same approach of using near synonyms with considerable 
overlapping meaning in other subparagraphs surrounding the 
“conceals, harbors, or shields from detection” subparagraph.223 
Specifically, the subparagraph immediately preceding the harboring 
subparagraph prohibits “transport[ing] or mov[ing]” an unlawfully 
present alien in furtherance of the original violation of entering the 
United States outside a specific port of entry.224 And the 
subparagraph immediately following prohibits “encourag[ing] and 
induc[ing] an alien to enter or remain” in the United States 
illegally.225 In other words, the Second Circuit noted that “[e]ach 
subpart thus focuses on a single kind of act, and those that use 
different terms to describe the act use near-synonyms with a clear 
216. Id. 
217. See id.  
218. Id. 
219. Id.   
220. Id. (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)). 
221. See id.  
222. See id.  
223. Id. at 379 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2005)).  
224. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2005)). 
225. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005)). 
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overlap in meaning: ‘transports’ and ‘moves’ . . . or ‘encourages’ and 
‘induces.’”226 Following this syntactical logic, the Second Circuit 
stated that “Congress did not intend the inclusion of ‘harbors’ in 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) to make that subsection, and that subsection
alone, simultaneously cover the two distinct acts of keeping from the 
authorities an alien’s presence and simply offering the alien a place 
to stay.”227 The Second Circuit thus concluded that: 
To “harbor” under § 1324, a defendant must engage in 
conduct that is intended both to substantially help an 
unlawfully present alien remain in the United States—such 
as by providing him with shelter, money, or other material 
comfort—and also is intended to help prevent the detection of the 
alien by the authorities.228 
V. CONSIDERATIONS OF SANCTUARY CONGREGATIONS IN TRUMP’S 
AMERICA
So where does this leave the definition of harboring with respect 
to congregations seeking to provide sanctuary? First, there must be 
some act substantially facilitating a person’s continued unlawful 
presence in the United States for liability under the anti-harboring 
provisions. Even in circuits that have said this element can be 
satisfied by “simple sheltering,” in practice, harboring requires more 
than merely assisting or aiding an undocumented person. Practically 
speaking, harboring also requires some act of obstruction intended 
to prevent the government from detecting an alien’s presence. This 
definition is faithful to the language of the statute, provides 
sufficient clarity, and is not dependent on government discretion. 
Conduct would not be harboring if the government knew of an 
undocumented immigrant staying at a church but chose not to arrest 
that person, so long as the church had not taken additional steps 
intended to prevent the government from learning of the 
undocumented person’s presence. Publicizing the potential 
presence of an undocumented guest ought to be a defense to 
harboring, as it alerts immigration authorities to the presence of a 
person who lacks the required authorizations. But this defense may 
be defeated if the defendant takes subsequent steps to interfere with 
226. Id. at 381–82.  
227. Id. at 382.   
228. Id. (emphasis added). 
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the authorities attempting to enforce the law.229 Publicity, however, 
would not be needed to defend against a harboring charge if the 
congregation took no affirmative steps to conceal, shield from 
detection, or otherwise prevent detection of the undocumented 
guest. 
Even the circuits that adopt the substantially facilitating element 
rely on evidence that the defendant took “steps that would shield 
[the undocumented persons’] identities from detection by the 
government,”230 or “warned [the illegally present persons] of the 
presence of the immigration officers so they might escape 
apprehension, detection, and deportation by the INS.”231 It is not 
enough to simply make it easier to remain in the United States 
illegally by providing housing, a ride, medical services, or day-to-day 
items. Some additional “but for” test is appropriate—such as, but for 
the defendant’s actions, would the unlawfully present person’s 
presence in the United States have ended, whether by that person 
deciding to leave the United States or by being taken into the 
custody of immigration authorities and placed into removal 
proceedings?  
So, where does this leave those congregations that seek to 
provide sanctuary? The answer depends on whether the 
congregation is involved in any kind of activity that resembles 
smuggling, arranging, assisting, or precipitating an illegal border 
crossing. In such circumstances, courts would likely apply cases from 
the 1980s that affirmed the convictions of “sanctuary” 
congregations.232 But it is important to note that these prosecutions 
were asserted under the anti-smuggling subparagraph of 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), and not the anti-concealment, harboring, and
shielding from detection subparagraph of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).233 
Generally, congregations in the 2010s have not been trying to 
smuggle noncitizens across the border and bypass official ports. 
Instead, they have responded with religious conviction and 
compassion to the human needs of noncitizens already present in 
the United States illegally—many of whom were children or adults 
with children. As has been the case historically, based on the authors’ 
229. See, e.g., United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1981). 
230. United States v. Shiu Sun Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007). 
231. United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). 
232. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982); supra Part III. 
233. See, e.g., Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 671–72. 
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own discussions with representatives of groups exploring or actually 
providing sanctuary to undocumented individuals, congregation 
members feel motivated to support undocumented individuals in 
desperate situations in a variety of ways, such as: providing safe 
housing; giving rides to medical appointments, groceries, and meals; 
helping with school enrollment for children; teaching English as a 
second language; and assisting in finding immigration or asylum 
counsel.  
There is no definite answer that can be given to the question of 
whether a sanctuary relationship violates the anti-concealment, 
harboring, and shielding from detection provisions of the INA.234 
Nevertheless, the following general principles and tendencies may 
apply: 
(1) Providing housing alone, without some other criminal 
intent (such as intent to conceal, or intent to benefit 
financially from the undocumented person’s illegal 
presence in the United States) should not be considered 
illegal harboring.235 
(2) Courts have found certain conduct to prevent detection 
or apprehension, and therefore could be viewed as facts 
that push a congregation’s sanctuary activities into 
harboring territory. These activities include: providing 
false documents to hide the lack of authorization to be in 
the country; warning people of an imminent 
immigration raid; and physically interfering with an 
official immigration investigation.236 
(3) Conduct that that courts have found to be illegal 
concealment, harboring, and shielding from detection 
include: helping a guest obtain false identification; 
providing false or fraudulent applications for lawful 
immigration status; hiding a person from an active search 
by immigration authorities; and giving false or fraudulent 
immigration status documents.237 
234. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2012). 
 235. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2005); see also United States v. Kendrick, 682 
F.3d 974, 984 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that an individual who assisted an alien into 
the country for the purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain violated 
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)).
236. See Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Xiong Hui Ye, 588 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Singh, 261 F.3d 530 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
237. See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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(4) On the other hand, courts have found certain other 
activities do not facilitate escape from detection and 
therefore likely would not nudge a congregation’s 
sanctuary activities over the harboring line (e.g., advising 
people to “lay low” and bringing someone to an 
immigration lawyer for asylum processing).238 
(5) Publicity may be a defense to harboring that could be 
rebutted with evidence that the congregation took 
subsequent steps to interfere with the lawful efforts of 
immigration authorities to detector apprehend an 
undocumented sanctuary guest.239 
Depending on all the services provided, at some point a 
congregation’s assistance could cross over into an even more vaguely 
worded provision of the INA—specifically, the anti-inducement and 
encouragement subparagraph of the statute.240 Like “harbor,” 
“inducement” and “encouragement” lack clear and consistent 
definitions in federal case law. 
However, the majority of courts that have defined this conduct 
have concluded “inducement” or “encouragement” require “an 
affirmative act that served as a catalyst for aliens to reside in the 
United States in violation of immigration law when they might not 
have otherwise,”241 and “not just general advice” or assistance.242 The 
Third Circuit decided that simply renting an apartment to known 
noncitizens is not such a catalyst where there is no evidence the 
noncitizen would not or could not have resided somewhere else in 
the United States.243  The Ninth Circuit has ruled that inducement 
and encouragement require that the defendant take some action 
“‘to convince the alien to . . . stay in this country,’ or to facilitate the 
alien’s ability to live in the country indefinitely.”244 Some circuits 
have adopted a lower bar. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, for 
example, have held that encouragement may be defined as “help.”245 
These cases have occurred in the smuggling context where it may be 
238. See, e.g., United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 99 (3d Cir. 2008).  
239. See id. at 1047.  
240. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012). 
241. DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2012).   
242. Id. at 248.  
243. Id. 
244. United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 245. See, e.g., United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954, 959–60 (7th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009).   
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easier to determine whether a defendant’s actions “helped” a 
noncitizen illegally enter the United States, because “entering” is a 
more discrete act with more clearly defined boundaries than 
“remaining.” The pilot of a boat used to smuggle illegal aliens into 
the United States clearly assists the act of illegal entry.  
“Remaining” in the United States is a more nebulous act. 
Helping someone remain in the United States illegally cannot 
reasonably be interpreted to mean providing any assistance of any 
kind to someone who is illegally present in the United States. If it 
did, then every person who provides any kind of service to a person 
known or reasonably suspected to be illegally present violates the 
law. For example, a good Samaritan who helps fix a flat tire, a nurse 
or doctor who treats an illness or injury, a homeless shelter that 
provides a roof, warm bed, and meal to an undocumented mother 
and her children. The act would need to go a bit further and 
demonstrate the specific intent to affect the unlawfully present 
person’s continued unlawful presence in the United States. At one 
end of the spectrum, any criminal or fraudulent means to assist a 
noncitizen’s unlawful presence in the United States is likely to be 
illegal encouragement or inducement; for example, altering a 
United States passport or producing fraudulent documents that 
could help a person work or live in the United States without 
authorization by enabling them to conceal the lack of 
authorization.246 On the other hand, encouraging a person to obtain 
counsel, or even assisting them in doing so, should not be 
considered illegal encouragement or inducement. 
It is also possible that an accumulation of otherwise lawful 
support could at some point combine to cross the line into unlawful 
encouragement and inducement. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, 
affirmed a conviction for encouragement or inducement where the 
defendant provided a noncitizen a place to live, an automobile, a cell 
phone, auto insurance, and a gym membership.247 This is what may 
be called a “rockslide” test: individual actions may not themselves 
carry any risk of criminal liability, but when piled together may cause 
 246. See, e.g., United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006); He, 
245 F.3d at 956 (ruling against a defendant who altered a United States passport in 
order to help a noncitizen enter the country illegally); United States v. Oloyede, 982 
F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1992) (ruling against a defendant who knowingly supplied 
jobs and social security numbers).   
247. See United States v. Batjargal, 302 F. App’x 188, 191 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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the legal ground to give way, and the exact trigger point may be 
impossible to determine. 
A congregation that pushes the envelope—by providing, for 
example, additional services such as medical services, education for 
the children of guests, ESL services, or even by not publicizing its 
sanctuary activity or by hosting a fundraiser—increases the risk that 
its conduct may cross the line into prohibited activity. That does not 
mean, however, it is any more likely to be investigated, prosecuted, 
or convicted. 
The principles and tendencies discussed above are suggestive 
only. It is possible that a congregation might be investigated or 
prosecuted even without a violation of black letter law and judicial 
precedent, except for the “simple sheltering” minority rule discussed 
above, which even where adopted has never been applied to an 
actual simple sheltering set of facts.248 Nevertheless, the government 
will have the burden of proving a novel theory of harboring and 
encouraging or inducing against a sympathetic set of defendants 
likely possessing many political allies and advocates. 
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the Trump administration has made it a 
top priority to harshly enforce our immigration laws in ways this 
country has not seen in generations. In response, many places of 
worship across the country have declared themselves to be 
sanctuaries to the most vulnerable immigrant populations among 
us.249 And while these congregations weigh their risk of liability, they 
are also mindful that those seeking sanctuary remain at risk of arrest, 
detention, and deportation, and that tensions have already begun to 
arise between the needs of those impacted by the government’s 
hardline actions and the goals of a movement focused on policy 
change. 
The Sanctuary Movement of our country’s recent past has 
provided many valuable lessons. Armed with those lessons, today’s 
sanctuary congregations must remember that the federal 
government has considerable discretion when deciding whether to 
press federal charges against them under the anti-harboring statute 
of section 1324. And while the decision to participate as a sanctuary 
248. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 2002). 
249. See Altemus, supra note 24, at 684; Goodstein, supra note 16.  
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congregation is an act of faith, the legal considerations mentioned 
in this article may help inform their faith-based decisions. 
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